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State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #5867
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8712
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JEREMY ORVILLE JOHNSON, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NOS. 42810, 42811, 42812, 42813 & 42814
BONNEVILLE COUNTY NOS.
CR 2012-18985, CR 2013-1265,
CR 2013-15367, CR 2013-15369
& CR 2013-15370
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jeremy Orville Johnson pleaded guilty to felony
injury to jail, and the district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one
year fixed. In a second case, Mr. Johnson pleaded guilty to felony possession of a
controlled substance, and the district court imposed a concurrent unified sentence of
seven years, with two years fixed. The district court suspended the sentences in both
cases and placed Mr. Johnson on probation for a period of five years.
Later, in a third case, Mr. Johnson pleaded guilty to felony delivery of a controlled
substance—methamphetamine. In two more felony delivery of a controlled substance—
methamphetamine cases, Mr. Johnson entered into a binding plea agreement and
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pleaded guilty. The district court revoked probation in the first and second cases and
executed the sentences. In the third, fourth, and fifth cases, the district court followed
the parties’ joint sentencing request from the binding plea agreement and imposed
concurrent unified sentences of twenty-five years, with eight years fixed.
Mr. Johnson filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) motion for a reduction of
sentence in each of the five cases. The district court denied the Rule 35 motions.
Mr. Johnson appealed in all five cases, asserting in his consolidated appeal the district
court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motions.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued the district court lost jurisdiction to
rule on Mr. Johnson’s Rule 35 motions, Mr. Johnson’s claim is barred by the doctrine of
invited error, and Mr. Johnson did not establish any basis for reversal of the district
court’s denial of his Rule 35 motions because he did not present any new evidence in
support of the motions. (Resp. Br., pp.2-6.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s arguments, which
are unavailing.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Johnson’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Johnson’s Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motions for a Reduction of Sentence?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Johnson’s Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motions For A Reduction Of Sentence
Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motions for a reduction of sentence, because his sentences are
excessive in view of the new and additional information presented with his Rule 35
motions. Specifically, Mr. Johnson presented new and additional information on his
desire to participate in a “rider” and provide financial support for his ailing father. (See
Nos. 42810, 42811, 42812, 42813, & 42814 Tr., Mar. 30, 2015 (hereinafter, Rule 35
Tr.), p.7, L.3 – p.14, L.13.)
A.

The District Court Acted Within A Reasonable Time In Ruling On The
Rule 35 Motions
The State argues Mr. Johnson’s Rule 35 motions were not timely ruled upon,

because the district court lost jurisdiction, due to the passage of time, to rule on the
motions. (Resp. Br., pp.2-3.) However, the district court here acted within a reasonable
time in ruling on the Rule 35 motions and therefore had jurisdiction.
Under Rule 35, a district court “may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the
filing of a judgment of conviction,” and “may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of
probation or upon motion made within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the order
revoking probation.” I.C.R. 35(b). However, the Idaho Supreme Court has held “a
district court does not lose jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion under Rule 35 merely
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because the 120-day period expires before the judge reasonably can consider and act
upon the motion.” State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 354 (1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Rather, “if the trial court does not rule upon the Rule 35 motion within a
reasonable time after the expiration of the 120-day period, the trial court loses
jurisdiction.” Id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held “[t]he reasonableness of any delay by the
district court in ruling upon a Rule 35 motion must be evaluated in light of the purposes
supporting the 120-day limitation and reasons for the trial court’s delay in each case.”
State v. Tranmer, 135 Idaho 614, 616 (Ct. App. 2001). “The 120-day limitation serves
two purposes:

it protects judges from repeated pleas by those sentenced and it

ensures ‘that the court does not usurp the responsibilities of the parole officials by
acting on the motion in light of the movant’s conduct while in prison.’” Id. (quoting State
v. Simpson, 131 Idaho 196, 197-98 (Ct. App. 1998)) (emphasis in original). In another
case, the Court of Appeals held that “when a defendant files Rule 35 motion, it will of
necessity become defense counsel’s responsibility to precipitate action on the motion
within a reasonable time frame, or otherwise provide an adequate record and
justification for delay, to avoid the risk of the trial court losing jurisdiction to consider the
motion.” State v. Day, 131 Idaho 184, 186 (Ct. App. 1998).
Here, Mr. Johnson has provided “an adequate record and justification for [the]
delay.” See id. The State acknowledges Mr. Johnson filed “timely Rule 35 motions”
(Resp. Br., p.2), and further notes Mr. Johnson filed the motions seven days after the
entry of the judgments of conviction and orders revoking probation. (Resp. Br., p.3.)
The State also observes “[t]he delay in ruling on the motions in this case was 175 days,
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161 days more than the original 14-day deadline for filing the motions timely from the
orders revoking probation and 55 days more than the original 120-day deadline for filing
the motions timely from the judgments of conviction.” (Resp. Br., p.3.)
The State then contends “the court had no jurisdiction at the time of the hearing
on the motions, held 181 days after the entry of the judgments and orders revoking
probation.” (Resp. Br., p.3.) In support of that contention, the State argues “nothing in
the record justifies such a lengthy delay.” (Resp. Br., p.3.) The State is incorrect. The
record actually shows the district court initially scheduled a hearing on the Rule 35
motions for 34 days after the entry of the judgments and orders revoking probation.
(See, e.g., R., p.618.)1 However, the parties stipulated to continue the hearing because
the prosecutor and investigating detective would be “unavailable due to previously
scheduled training.” (See, e.g., R., pp.342-46.) The district court, “[b]ased upon the
Motion of the State,” then rescheduled the Rule 35 motions hearing. (E.g., R., p.618.)
The district court continued the Rule 35 motions hearing several more times,
before vacating the hearing.

(See, e.g., R., pp.12-13 (register of actions for

No. 42810).) The district court later set a new date for a Rule 35 motions hearing, and
subsequently continued that hearing. (See, e.g., R., p.13.) When the district court
finally conducted a hearing, Mr. Johnson’s counsel advised the district court that
Mr. Johnson

wanted

counsel

to

withdraw

because

counsel

had

prosecuted

Mr. Johnson’s father years ago and Mr. Johnson claimed a conflict of interest. (E.g.,
R., p.626.) The district court allowed defense counsel to withdraw, appointed conflict
The “E.g.” and “See, e.g.,” signals throughout this brief generally indicate the cited
documents were filed in all five cases in this consolidated appeal. For example, the
district court’s Orders to Continue, filed on October 30, 2014 in all five cases, may be
found on pages 117, 236, 347, 482, and 618 of the record.
1
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counsel to represent Mr. Johnson, and rescheduled the Rule 35 motions hearing. (E.g.,
R., p.626.)
The parties then filed a Joint Stipulation to Continue the Rule 35 motions hearing
from the rescheduled date, “for reason that the Defendant’s counsel has been recently
appointed and needs additional time to receive the Defendant’s file.

Further,

Defendant’s counsel has a conflicting hearing in Fremont County, Idaho.”

(E.g.,

R., p.630.)

(E.g.,

The parties thus jointly stipulated to reschedule the hearing.

R., p.630.) The district court ordered the hearing be continued as the parties stipulated.
(E.g., R., p.628.)
Thus, there is ample support in the record here for the delay. The district court
would have conducted a hearing on the Rule 35 motions as early as 34 days after the
entry of the judgments and orders revoking probation, but the parties stipulated to a
continuance based upon the State’s prosecutor and investigating detective being
unavailable.

(See, e.g., R., p.618.)

The district court later continued the hearing

several more times. (See, e.g., R., pp.12-13.) When a hearing finally took place, the
district court continued the Rule 35 motions hearing after allowing defense counsel to
withdraw for a claimed conflict of interest with Mr. Johnson. (See, e.g., R., p.626.) The
parties then stipulated to another continuance, this time because newly-appointed
counsel for Mr. Johnson needed additional time to receive the file and had a conflicting
hearing. (See, e.g., R., p.630.) Based on the specific facts of this case, the district
court acted within a reasonable time in ruling on Mr. Johnson’s Rule 35 motions and
therefore had jurisdiction at the time of the hearing on the motions.

See State v.

Veloquio, 141 Idaho 154, 156 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding a seven-month delay between
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the entry of a judgment of conviction and the district court’s ruling on a Rule 35 motion
was reasonable, based on the specific facts of that case).2
B.

The Invited Error Doctrine Does Not Apply, Because Mr. Johnson Did Not Invite
The District Court To Deny His Rule 35 Motions
The State argues Mr. Johnson’s claim on appeal is barred by the doctrine of

invited error. (See Resp. Br., p.4.) More specifically, the State contends that because
Mr. Johnson “stipulated to the sentences he received in case numbers 42812, 42813,
and 42814 and to the revocation of probation and execution of his underlying sentences
in case numbers 42810 and 42811, he cannot claim on appeal that the district court
abused its discretion by following the plea agreement or that the district court abused its
discretion by declining to reduce his sentences.”

(Resp. Br., pp.4-5.)

The State’s

argument on this point ignores the fact that Mr. Johnson has not challenged the district
court’s initial sentencing and probation revocation decisions, but rather he has
challenged the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motions. Mr. Johnson did not invite
the district court to deny his Rule 35 motions. Thus, the invited error doctrine does
not apply.
Under the invited error doctrine, “one may not successfully complain of errors
one has acquiesced in or invited. Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or invited are not
reversible.” State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838 (1983) (citation omitted). The invited

Considering the State stipulated to at least two of the district court’s periods of delay in
ruling on the Rule 35 motions (see, e.g., R., pp.618, 626), the doctrine of judicial
estoppel should bar the State from arguing an incompatible position on appeal. See
Hoagland v. Ada County, 154 Idaho 900, 912 (2005) (“Judicial estoppel precludes a
party from advantageously taking one position, then subsequently seeking a second
position that is incompatible with first.”).

2
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error doctrine “applies to sentencing decisions as well as rulings made during trial.”
State v. Edghill, 155 Idaho 846, 849 (Ct. App. 2014).
Here, Mr. Johnson did not invite the district court to deny his Rule 35 motions.
Mr. Johnson did not assert in his Rule 35 motions that the district court’s initial
sentencing and probation revocation decisions were erroneous at the time the district
court made those decisions. (See, e.g., R., p.605.) Nor did Mr. Johnson challenge the
district court’s initial sentencing and probation revocation decisions on appeal. (See
generally App. Br.) Rather, Mr. Johnson asserted at the Rule 35 motions hearing that
the sentences were excessive in light of the new and additional evidence presented with
the Rule 35 motions. (See Rule 35 Tr., p.15, Ls.8-13.) Mr. Johnson did not consent to,
acquiesce in, or invite the district court’s denial of the Rule 35 motions. (See generally
Rule 35 Tr.) Because Mr. Johnson did not invite the district court to deny his Rule 35
motions, the invited error doctrine does not apply. Cf. Edghill, 155 Idaho at 849-50
(holding the invited error doctrine did not apply because the specific relief the defendant
sought was not what was granted by the district court).
C.

Mr. Johnson Presented New And Additional Information In Support Of The
Rule 35 Motions
The State argues that, “because [Mr.] Johnson presented no new evidence in

support of his Rule 35 motions, he failed to demonstrate in the motions that his
sentences were excessive. Having failed to make such a showing, he has failed to
establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s orders denying his Rule 35
motions.”

(Resp. Br., pp.4-5.)

However, Mr. Johnson actually presented new and

additional information in support of the Rule 35 motions.
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion,
the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). “An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the
presentation of new information.” Id.
In this case, Mr. Johnson presented new and additional information in support of
his Rule 35 motions. Mr. Johnson presented new and additional information on his
desire to participate in a “rider” and provide financial support for his ailing father. (See
Rule 35 Tr., p.7, L.3 – p.14, L.13.)
The State argues this was not new or additional information, “as information with
respect to [Mr.] Johnson’s desire to help his ailing father was contained in the PSI and
[Mr.] Johnson advised the court of his desire to participate in the rider program at the
time of his sentencing/disposition hearing.”

(Resp. Br., p.5 (citations omitted).)

However, the portion of the PSI cited by the State only contained information from
Mr. Johnson that his father was dying and had MS, and that he wanted to “give my dad
as good and comfortable of a life as I can as he dies.” (See PSI, p.13.) The PSI did not
contain the information presented at the Rule 35 motions hearing that Mr. Johnson’s
father was getting more and more disabled as time went on, also had severe nerve
damage in his back, and had been trying to get Social Security Disability benefits for
three years to no avail. (See Rule 35 Tr., p.11, L.22 – p.14, L.13.)
Similarly, while Mr. Johnson expressed his desire to participate in a rider at the
sentencing and probation violation evidentiary/disposition hearing for all five cases (see,
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e.g., No. 42810 Tr., p.25, L.25 – p.26, L.7), Mr. Johnson informed the district court at
the Rule 35 motions hearing he wanted to move away from Idaho after he was
released.

(Rule 35 Tr., p.7, Ls.3-8.)

Mr. Johnson further testified at the Rule 35

motions hearing that he responded well to treatment and wanted to interstate compact
to Tennessee. (Rule 35 Tr., p.8, Ls.1-13.)
Thus, contrary to the State’s argument, Mr. Johnson presented new and
additional information in support of his Rule 35 motions. Even if the Court were to
determine the information is not “new,” it would still be “additional” information as
contemplated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Huffman. See Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203.
In view of that new and additional information, Mr. Johnson asserts that his sentences
are excessive. Despite the State’s unavailing arguments, Mr. Johnson submits that the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motions for a reduction
of sentence.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the orders denying his
Rule 35 motions and remand his cases to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 25th day of April, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of April, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
JEREMY ORVILLE JOHNSON
INMATE #85236
ISCC
PO BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707
JOEL E TINGEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
KELLY D MALLARD
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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__________/s/_______________
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